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Abstract 
We determine the effects of various management restrictions on adoption rates of 
marine Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes. Choice experiments are 
used in order to determine how fisher participation rates change under different 
marine PES programme designs. Various designs, with differing restriction rates, show 
different rates of adoption. However, fishers show a high utility loss associated with 
any move away from the current management situation, irrespective of restriction 
levels. This indicates that PES scheme costs may be high and creating an enabling 
environment could be important to reducing perceived losses, as could investment into 
conditional in-kind compensation mechanisms. The paper also shows choice 
experiments to be a useful tool in marine PES design.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the past decade Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have attracted 
increasing interest as an innovative conservation instrument. PES seek to address 
market failures whereby environmental services are not attributed their true value, and 
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increase investment into resource conservation. More specifically, PES attempt to 
capture those economic benefits derived from environmental services, such as clean 
water, and channel them back to the ecosystem managers who frequently benefit less 
from resource conservation than alternative land uses (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 
2005).  
PES are defined as a voluntary agreement between a service provider and a service 
buyer (Wunder 2005). Inducing participation is central to the success of PES as a policy 
instrument: potential service providers must voluntarily agree to enrol in any 
programme design (Newton et al., 2012).  
Studies relating to PES participation have increased in the past few years. These have 
mainly been limited to the study of design factors which improve cost-efficiency 
(Petheram & Campbell 2010), as well as the implications project design can have on 
equality across stakeholder participation (e.g. Zilberman et al., 2008). More recently, 
the literature has looked towards addressing the need to understand potential 
providers’ willingness to participate in PES (Newton et al., 2012; Gong et al., 2010; Ma 
et al., 2010; Petheram & Campbell 2010; Zbinden & Lee 2005). However, these studies 
have mostly concentrated on describing endogenous individual and household 
determinants influencing adoption or non-adoption of PES schemes by service 
providers. While such information can be useful in targeting households and/or 
communities for PES interventions, these factors are often inflexible and of limited 
service to policy makers (Ruto & Garrod 2009).  
In practice, very few studies have considered those elements of programme design 
which induce service provider participation. The influence that design factors exert 
over a scheme’s attractiveness have recently received attention within the context of 
agri-environmental payment schemes (AES) (Ruto & Garrod 2009). AES have much in 
common with PES in that they are voluntary, incentive-based, conditional and pay for 
delivery of a desired landscape/land use (Dobbs & Pretty 2008; Ferraro 2008). These 
recent studies have shown that AES design can indeed influence participation of 
service sellers. Ruto & Garrod (2009) show that schemes which were designed to be 
more flexible and offered shorter contracts required lower financial incentives to 
induce participation. Similarly, Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) found that those 
programmes which allowed the maintenance of agricultural activity and did not 
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impose stringent restrictions on farm management were also adopted at lower contract 
prices. Although not directly relating to AES per se, Qin et al. (2011) found that farmers 
in China were highly concerned with property rights. The provision of priority rights 
for contract renewal significantly increased farmers’ marginal willingness to pay for of 
existing forestland contracts.  
To a greater extent, policy design can be extremely important in achieving adequate 
acceptance and compliance within the fishery sector and will be particularly important 
in rural and low-income areas where monitoring and enforcement efforts are often low 
and/or extremely complex (Lundquist & Granek 2005; McClanahan et al., 2005; 
Christie 2004). Combined local fishery and conservation goals can be achieved through 
the merging of diverse management measures. Closed areas and gear modifications 
jointly will be needed to address wider scale issues of overfishing (Worm et al., 2009). 
However compliance, particularly in poor and rural settings, will hinge on community 
acceptance of any conservation modifications. Previous interventions, principally 
designed with little consensus from local fishers, have largely failed because they were 
unable to inspire compliance (Ferse et al., 2010; Pomeroy et al., 2001) or cover the 
opportunity costs of these low-income communities with few alternatives 
(Mohammed, 2012). For this reason, understanding how local fishers’ value 
management restrictions is of the utmost importance. 
Within this paper we concentrate on how the design of PES instruments can influence 
participation within a marine setting, a topic which, to date, remains largely 
unaddressed by the PES literature both terrestrially and within the marine context. 
This paper uses choice experiments (CE) to investigate some aspects of marine PES 
design. To date there is little application of CE within fisheries management (Wattage 
et al., 2011), more specifically, how restriction infrastructures may lower or induce 
participation by local environmental providers. In doing so this paper highlights the 
importance of community participation and input at the earliest stages of PES design. 
CE is also shown as a useful tool in assessing service provider trade-offs, and 
ultimately for marine management design.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the importance of 
appropriate instrument design within the marine conservation setting, as well as a 
review of fisher preferences for management options. Section 3 presents the study area, 
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after which Section 4 introduces the methodological background and the choice model, 
discusses the use of choice modelling within fisheries management and goes on to 
describe the choice experiment and the econometric analysis framework in detail. 
Results are presented in Section 5. A discussion of the findings and their policy 
implications is found in Section 6. Conclusions are given in Section 7.  
2. Fishers and management schemes 
Within small-scale artisanal fisheries, marine management has generally favoured 
regulatory solutions. Of these, the most prolific are MPAs (Agardy et al., 2003). Total 
prohibition of fishing is ultimately the environmentally optimal management option; 
evidence of environmental benefits from regulated MPAs is clear (Agardy, 2000). 
However, MPAs may not be the most economical, nor the more socially just. MPAs can 
be inefficient and ineffectual, and can further pose unrealistic and unjustifiable 
burdens on local low-income fishing communities (Cinner et al., 2009a). In reality, 
MPA success has been mixed: site-selection can favour less accessible and less 
degraded areas; resource use often leaks into surrounding areas; and designated areas 
are often too small in area to protect the wider seascape (Cinner 2010; Lele et al., 2010; 
Graham et al., 2008).  
Restrictions on environmentally damaging fishing gears can form another type of 
conservation intervention; certain fishing gears have a higher propensity over others to 
negatively impact the marine environment (Akpalu 2010). The use of more destructive 
gear types can: increase physical damage to the substrate; capture a high proportion of 
juvenile fish; target species important to reef resilience and deter others from fishing 
sustainably (Akpalu 2010; Cinner 2010). As such, gear restrictions can be a further 
effective fisheries management tool and often receive higher support from local fishers 
(Cinner et al., 2009a). However, the management of artisanal fishers, including the gear 
they use can be difficult due to their loose, and often poor, organisation (McClanahan 
& Mangi 2004).  
Moving towards more sustainable fisheries often requires a reduction in effort or a 
switch in methods; both of which pose short-term costs on vulnerable fishers. PES have 
the potential to complement existing marine management instruments through the 
provision of short-term incentives. Where local costs are high in the initial stages of 
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restriction measures – whether they be a spatial or gear restriction – PES can assist in 
compensation for loss of catch, for example. PES should not be viewed as an 
instrument working in isolation but one that supports current management tools.  
Whilst PES may be able to address some of the immediate issues of compensation, they 
will still need to consider local situations and preferences in order to be successful. 
Fishers have been documented to hold varying preferences for conservation 
management restrictions (Cinner et al., 2009a; McClanahan & Mangi 2004). Stakeholder 
involvement in the early stages of marine conservation development and 
implementation has been identified as one characteristic of successful approaches 
(Leslie 2005; Lundquist and Granek 2005). Careful consideration of the receptivity of 
these communities and fishers to design and implementation of conservation 
interventions is essential for long-term success (Christie 2004).  
Analysis of fisher trade-offs will have numerous benefits. Identification of trade-offs, 
and resulting design will improve adoption of conservation instrument by local actors. 
Furthermore, if one assumes that fishers show preferences for the PES design1 which 
has the lowest utility cost to them overall, this may lead to more cost-effective PES 
design.  
3. The case study: Mtwara region, Tanzania 
Tanzania’s coastline supports approximately 25% of the country’s 43 million strong 
population of which a high proportion rely on coastal fisheries as a source of food and 
income. Most marine extraction activities are conducted within the shallow near shore 
waters (Gustavson et al., 2009; Silva 2006).  As population and fisher numbers continue 
to increase, these coastal resources come under increasing pressure; Tanzanian marine 
fisheries have suffered a significant decline in biodiversity and productivity in the past 
three decades (Silva 2006).  
Located in the south of Tanzania, Mtwara’s coastal waters are of high national and 
international importance. The area contains some of Tanzania’s most significant 
biodiversity. Part of the Eastern African Marine Ecosystem (EAME), its coral reef, 
                                                     
1 PES design is considered herein to include various levels of restrictions faced by fishers. This will include 
facets of MPA restriction such as area under closure as well as further restrictions placed on gear. In reality 
MPA design will be an integral part of PES design, whereby PES refers to the addition of a compensation 
mechanism to restricted extraction and/or access.  
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which extends south from neighbouring region Lindi to the Mozambican border, 
connects with the Mozambican Quirimbas reef system. Together these reef systems are 
of critical importance as sources of marine larvae and spores which disperse out to 
northern and southern marine ecosystems; the Southern Equatorial Current diverges in 
this area creating an area of high replenishment capability (Shao et al., 2003; WWF 
2004). At the same time, the area supports a large human population. With poor 
transport infrastructure, marginal soils and high levels of illiteracy and poverty as the 
norm, Mtwara’s coastal community is highly dependent on marine resources 
(Gustavson et al., 2009; Malleret 2004).  
In response to increasing environmental threats and high biological significance, the 
Tanzanian government gazetted Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) 
in 2000. Formed under the Marine Parks and Reserves Act (1994), MBREMP is under 
the control of the Marine Reserves Park Unit (MRPU). Outside of the marine park 
fishery enforcement falls under the mandate of the Fisheries Division of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism. The MRPU’s mandate is to establish and ensure 
sustainable conservation of areas of outstanding marine ecological importance, and to 
manage them in partnership with the coastal communities. Management activities 
include patrolling of enforced no-take zones and gear restrictions; these are supported 
through the enactment of village and district by-laws (Silva 2006).  However, the park 
has met some community resistance, both within and outside of its borders due to local 
perceptions of loss, particularly through tighter enforcement of gear restrictions.   
MBREMP is effectively a multi-purpose marine park, and continues to allow fishing 
within its borders. Regulations within the park are essentially the same as those 
outside, albeit enforced more frequently. These include: prohibition of certain 
destructive gears such as beach seine nets and dynamite; mangrove cutting for 
commercial sale; and the use of nets with meshing smaller than 3” (Robinson et al., 
2012). 
4. Methodology: choice experiments 
Understanding how fishers’ perceive the loss associated with various fishing 
restrictions as well as their preferences for alternative management strategies will serve 
to improve PES design and compliance. To test fishers’ preferences for various PES 
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management options, and investigate the trade-offs between these options, we 
implement a CE (Bateman et al., 2002; Louviere et al., 2000).  
A survey-based stated preference (SP) technique, CE presents respondents with several 
choice sets, each containing a set of mutually exclusive hypothetical alternatives, and 
asks them to choose their preferred alternative in each choice set. Each alternative is 
described by a set of characteristics, known as attributes (Blamey et al., 2000; Mangham 
et al., 2009), which take on different levels. Choices between the alternatives reveal 
respondents’ implicit trade-offs between attribute levels (Louviere et al., 2000).  
Unlike the more commonly used contingent valuation method, CE enables 
environmental changes to be described and valued in terms of a specific set of 
characteristics. With the inclusion of a cost or payment attribute, marginal utility 
estimates can easily be converted into willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to 
accept (WTA) estimates for changes in attribute levels. In this way, information can be 
gathered on: (a) those attributes which are significant determinants of the ‘good’; (b) 
the relative importance of individual attributes; (c) an individual’s marginal rate of 
substitution between attributes; and (d) the associated utility cost or benefit of each of 
the different combinations of attributes (Louviere et al., 2000; Wattage et al., 2005). 
SP approaches have received much debate regarding their merits and limitations 
within the academic literature. Much of this criticism centres on the technique’s 
hypothetical nature. Hypothetical bias arises when people overstate their WTP for a 
good due to the absence of real economic commitments (Mitchell and Carson 1993; 
Neill et al., 1994). This bias has been shown to be higher for those respondents who are 
less knowledgeable, for unfamiliar changes and for voluntary payments vehicles, such 
as WTA rather than WTP formats (Atkinson & Mourato 2008). In addition, CE have 
been criticised for increasing the cognitive burden placed on the respondent; the 
attribute-based contingent scenarios may be more complex and there is a limit on the 
amount of information respondents can meaningfully handle while making a decision. 
This in turn can give rise to further problems of: learning and fatigue effects leading to 
apparently irrational choices; increased random errors associated with complexity of 
task; and satisficing rather than utility-maximising behaviour (Hanley et al., 2001).  
As with other SP methods, CE success depends critically on having an accurate, 
meaningful and understandable scenario; hence careful survey design is essential. The 
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additional information that CE can glean about respondent’s preferences has led to 
many viewing CE as having an advantage over contingent valuation. Indeed, over the 
last decade, CE has been increasingly used to value the effects of changes in 
environmental attributes, and, more recently, different characteristics of policy design 
(Ruto & Garrod 2009; Hanley et al., 2003). 
4.1 CE and fisheries management 
To date there has been little application of CE within fisheries management (Wattage et 
al., 2011). Of notable exception are the works of Wattage et al. (2011; 2005) and Aas et 
al. (2000). Wattage et al. (2011) uses a CE approach to determine the economic value 
held by the Irish public for the conservation of deep-sea corals using MPA variant 
management options. Wattage et al. (2005) demonstrated the applicability of CE in the 
evaluation of three over-riding management options and its ability to offer meaningful 
information to the management process. Furthermore, Aas et al. (2000) showed CE to 
be particularly useful in the evaluation of various fishery management options for 
harvest regulation within a Norwegian recreational fishery. However, despite growing 
application in the industrial fishing arena, CE has been little used within low-income 
rural settings, terrestrially and indeed coastally (Glenk et al., 2006).  
4.2 CE design 
Questionnaire design followed the principles laid out by Bateman et al. (2002). 
Alongside the CE, surveys collected data on: individual and household demographics; 
household assets; attitudes relating to fishing, environment and conservation; and 
fishing practices, income and livelihood diversification strategies.  
The CE revolves around fishers’ preferences for various PES management restrictions. 
After reading a scenario relating to the implementation of a prospective PES 
programme, respondents were presented with a series of choice sets, illustrating 
possible PES programme options, and asked to choose their most preferred. The 
hypothetical options were presented as possible governmental and marine park 
authority PES conservation programmes 2. The following sections describe the key 
                                                     
2 Within Tanzanian marine parks fishing rights are controlled by the Marine Park Authority; however, 
outside the marine park, boundaries management is in the hands of the Tanzanian Government fisheries 
division.  
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elements of the CE: the selection of attributes and levels of the possible PES scheme, 
the experimental choice card design, the scenario, and the data collection process.   
4.2.1 Attribute and levels selection 
The first step in implementing the CE is the determination of realistic attributes and 
attribute levels which define the good to be valued (Mogas et al., 2006; Bennett & 
Blamey 2001; Hanley et al., 2001). The good here is a hypothetical marine PES 
management plan that comprises two restriction attributes and a payment attribute.  
The CE attributes and levels used are displayed in Table 1. The selection of relevant 
attributes and attribute levels was based on information gathered from peer-group 
meetings and semi-structured interviews, from current management options, as well as 
management options that an implementing organisation would be able to influence 
through policy design. Peer-group meetings and interviews were conducted within 
each of the six fishing communities chosen for research (see 4.2.4 below) and were 
further sub-divided for fisher-types. Appropriate marine management restrictions 
were thus selected based upon importance to fishers, as identified in community focus 
groups and interviews, as well as to fit relevant locally applicable management 
options3.  
In order to minimise issues of cognitive burden, particularly within communities 
unaccustomed to CE techniques, management scenarios were constrained to the two 
most relevant attributes which emerged from group meetings and interviews: gear 
restrictions and area closures. Both these management measures are considered to be 
credible and realistic for the areas in question; past governmental interventions have in 
fact involved net restrictions and marine zone closures. A third attribute relating to the 
compensation payment package (i.e. the monetary incentive of the PES scheme) was 
further included. The payments were described as weekly compensation payments for 
changes brought on by PES management design. All attributes and attribute levels 
were piloted. After the first round of pre-testing, the compensation payment attribute 
levels were found to be too low and suitably adjusted. 
Table 1. Attribute and attribute levels in choice model experiment  
                                                     
3 MRPU management activities currently include patrolling of enforced no-take zones and gear restrictions. 
These are supported through the enactment of village and district by-laws (Silva 2006).   
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PES scheme attribute Description  Attribute level 
Size of no-take area  Area as % of current fishing area in which fishing will 
no longer be permitted and declared MPA. 
0, 10, 25, 50 
Size of permitted net 
meshing 
Net mesh size in inches permitted that fishers are 
permitted to use within fishing grounds. Mesh size is 
measured as size when mesh pulled at each corner. 
1, 3, 6 
Payment Weekly payment in Tanzanian Shillings (TSh) made 
under PES scheme4. a 
-1000, 5000, 10,000, 
20,000 
a Payments reported as US$ equivalent where US$ 1 is equal to 1450 TSh.  
 
Large differences were noted in the PES management attributes fishers preferred. At 
some levels certain restrictions were considered highly beneficial to some fishers while 
highly detrimental to others, e.g. some fishers preferred smaller net meshing while 
others favoured larger nets. Some fishers were found to be willing to pay for ‘more 
attractive’ management options such as the legislation of small meshed nets. As such 
an additional negative compensation payment option (-1000 TSh) was included 
alongside positive compensatory payments (Table 1). This would assess if some fishers 
valued these losses highly enough to be willing to accept negative compensation or, in 
other words, to be willing to pay for the instatement of 1” nets, which are currently 
illegal. 
4.2.2 Experimental choice card design 
Generating all possible combinations of attribute levels across all three chosen 
attributes produced a total of 48 possible PES management scenarios (i.e. 4 levels of the 
no-take area size attribute * 3 levels of the mesh size attribute * 4 levels of the payment 
attribute). It was considered excessive to use the full-factorial design in the field and so 
possible management alternatives were reduced to 16, using an orthogonal fractional 
factorial design (Louviere et al., 2000). From such a design it is possible to obtain what 
are known in the literature as ‘main effects’; that is the extent to which variations in 
behaviour can be explained purely by the levels of each of the individual attributes 
presented. Louviere (1988) states that more than 80% of respondent behaviour can 
typically be explained in terms of main effects alone.  
                                                     
4 Payments reported as US$ equivalent where US$ 1 is equal to 1450 TSh. 
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It was then noted that the combination of small 1” nets with a negative compensation 
payment (i.e. representing fishers willing to pay for the implementation of this 
regulation) was not present within the 16 scenarios selected via orthogonal design (that 
is, negative payments were only included for 3” and 6” nets), although this was a 
management option which many fishers seemed to prefer during piloting as noted 
above. Therefore, two additional scenarios were included in the final CE design which 
combined the negative compensation value (-1000TSh) with small meshing 1” nets 
(and various degrees of closure: 0 & 10%). A total of 18 management scenarios were 
therefore used in the final experiment. 5 
The 18 experimentally designed management scenarios were then organised into a 
series of choice sets. Each choice set contained three PES management options: two of 
the experimentally designed alternatives described above (Cards 1 and 2), to which the 
current status quo baseline scenario was added (Card 3). Choice cards 1 and 2 were 
picked at random by the enumerator without replacement from a bag containing all 18 
scenario cards (Louviere et al., 2000). The scenarios presented in the choice sets were 
unlabelled, i.e. generic6. Each respondent was presented with six of these randomly 
generated choice set triplets, which was the maximum deemed feasible in the 
circumstances. A choice set example is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Fig 1 Example of choice set  
Attributes  Management 
Option 1 
 Management 
Option 2 
 Status Quo 
Closure  10  50  0 
% closed of current fishing 
grounds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net  6  1  3 
                                                     
5 It should be noted that through the addition of two extra cards, the final set of cards presented is not 
fully orthogonal in design. However, when analysis is undertaken using a logit regression framework, as 
in the present case, orthogonality although desirable is no longer essential for the method to work 
satisfactorily. Hence the inclusion of these additional cards should not have a marked impact in the 
parameter estimates.  
6 See Louviere et al. (2000) and Fimereli and Mourato (2013) for a discussion and examples of the 
differences between labelled and unlabelled alternatives in choice experiments. 
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mesh size in “  
 
 
 
 
 
Payment  
(TSh) 
 10,000  5,000  0 
 
As described in Section 4.2.1 and depicted in Fig. 1, each scenario was described by 
three attributes: the possible size of marine area to be designated as a no-take zone, 
gear restrictions placed on allowable net sizes (i.e. size of mesh), and a monetary 
compensation. The monetary compensation was offered as a weekly sum in local 
currency (Tanzanian Shillings: TSh) but is reported within the results below as the US$ 
equivalent.  
In order to improve respondents’ understanding of the management scenarios 
presented and improve familiarity with possible changes, visual aids were used to 
represent attributes and attribute levels (Fig. 1). 7 Visual aids have been shown to 
reduce task complexity and improve choice by increasing understanding within low-
literacy respondents (Jae and DelVecchio, 2004).  
Fishers were also run through an example before starting the CE as further explanation 
and for enumerators to judge fisher comprehension.  
4.2.3 The scenario 
In order for any CE to be relevant it must be understandable and meaningful to the 
local area. As noted above, the scenario here is a hypothetical marine PES management 
plan that comprises two restriction attributes and a payment attribute. Specifically, the 
hypothetical scenario was presented to fishers in the following way: 
“I want you to think about the current law and about further prohibitions in your fishing area, 
more specifically the introduction of additional no-take zones and the prohibition of certain 
gears. These changes come with compensation for these additional restrictions. 
I am going to show you three choice cards. Two cards will show you new fishing regulations 
and the third card shows you the current regulation in your fishing area. 
                                                     
7 This is particularly important as education levels among the fishers in our sample were found to be low: 
96.2% claimed to have no formal education or attended school only at the primary level. 
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Each card has two attributes relating to the possible changes in law which can change:  
• The percentage of your current fishing area to be closed to fishing 
• The allowable net mesh size (in inches) 
The final attribute on these cards is a monetary value. This is the level of compensation per week 
you would receive if these restrictions were put in place. Please remember, the values shown in 
BLUE are payments you would receive. Values shown in RED are payments you would make 
each week to have the new restrictions put in place.  
Monitoring and enforcement would be a collaboration between the community and the Marine 
Park Authority/Beach Management Unit. Payments would be made monthly and all payments 
would be withdrawn if the restrictions were not followed. 
Please consider carefully which of the scenarios on the cards you prefer, thinking about how 
each restriction would effect your fishing catch, the compensation you would receive and the 
trade-offs between the three.” 
Following this explanation of the hypothetical PES scheme and the choice cards, 
respondents were then presented with six choice sets, each containing 3 choice cards as 
exemplified in Fig.1. 
4.2.4 Data collection 
Primary data was collected from six coastal villages located within the Mtwara region 
of southern Tanzania. A marine PES scheme will require participation by all marine 
resource users so it was important to collect data across a variety of village types. 
Villages were therefore selected to give a representative sample of the area and were 
selected from both within and outside of the Park boundaries.  
Face-to-face interviews were administered with local fishers by trained local 
enumerators. After an initial round of piloting, fisher surveys including the CE were 
conducted with village fishermen between April and July 2010. Initially fishers were 
targeted using random selection from lists provided by the local village leaders. 
However, it quickly became obvious that fishers’ unpredictability meant a less 
probabilistic sampling method was necessary. Initial pilot meetings identified some 
fishers to be sampled; further fishers were selected within villages and landing sites 
using a non-probabilistic opportunistic sampling method. A total of 317 fishers 
provided complete answers to the questionnaire.  
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4.3 CE analysis 
As noted above, the CE was designed to identify fishers’ valuations of two different 
attributes of the PES management schemes: net size, and closure. Each fisher was 
presented with six sets of three management alternatives (two new alternatives vs. the 
status quo), with each alternative being defined by its combination attribute levels.  
In order to analyse choices between three or more alternatives as a function of the 
attributes of the alternatives as well as the characteristics of the individual making the 
choice a conditional logit model (CLM) is used. The CLM estimates the probability that 
individual i chooses alternative j, as described by McFadden (1974): 
      (1) 
where represents both the individual ’s characteristics and the choice-specific 
attributes. Any variables that do not vary across alternatives, such as individual-
specific socio-economic characteristics and fisher types, drop out of the model unless 
they are interacted with variables that are alternative-specific, such as the attributes of 
the alternatives (Hensher et al., 2005)  
The CLM assumes homogenous preferences across respondents and independence 
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA8).  More specifically, the CLM:  (1) can represent 
systematic but not random taste variations (e.g. those that can be linked to observed 
respondent characteristics but those which cannot be linked and cannot be explicitly 
modelled); (2) displays restrictive substitution patterns (e.g. assumes all pairs of 
alternatives are equally similar or dissimilar); and (3) is able to model situations where 
unobservable influences are independent but unable where correlation is generated 
between alternatives (Hoyos 2010; Hensher et al. 2005).   
The choice sets presented to fishers (as described in Section 4.2.2) show three 
management scenarios, two which represent the introduction of new regulations plus 
the status quo (no additional restrictions). As such it is possible that respondents 
                                                     
8  IIA states that the ratio/likelihood of choosing any two choice options will be unaffected by the 
attributes or availability of the other options present, that is that the ratio of probabilities of any two 
options is independent of the choice set (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Put more simply, all pairs of 
alternatives are equally similar or dissimilar (Hensher et al. 2005). 
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choose their preferred management option using a two-stage process. That is, in the 
first instance, respondents choose between supporting or not-supporting a new 
‘improved’ management scheme. If a change to the current marine management is 
chosen, respondents then choose between new management Option 1 and 2. This 
choice path is illustrated in Figure 2. This implies that the ratio of the choice 
probabilities for any two alternatives would be affected by the addition or removal of 
one set of alternatives and as such violates the IIA assumption, rendering the CLM 
inappropriate (Blamey et al. 2000).  
  
In order to accommodate possible IIA violations within the CE, a nested logit model 
(NLM) can be used. The NLM avoids the need to rely on IIA by modelling choices in a 
hierarchical nested structure. This device allows error terms across choices within each 
‘nest’ to be correlated with one another, although choices across ‘nests’ are still 
assumed to be uncorrelated (Heiss, 2002). Error terms are assumed to follow a Type B 
Gumbel extreme value distribution as shown in equation (2) (as opposed to the 
conventional extreme value distribution assumed for the CLM model). The degree of 
correlation between the error terms is captured by the parameter ρ. Indeed, the CLM 
can be regarded as a special case of this model when the parameter ρ takes a value of 
one.  
   (2) 
In a two tier choice structure, the probability of choosing a particular alternative k out 
of the n second stage options, conditional on having selected a particular alternative j 
out of the m first stage options, can be expressed as indicated in equation (3). The 
logarithm of the denominator of this expression is known as the inclusive value (I), 
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because it summarises the information about the alternatives included in this lower 
nest. Inserting this inclusive value as an explanatory variable in the first stage of the 
decision tree yields the expression for the unconditional probability of choosing option 
j out of the m first stage options, given in equation (4). 
                         (3) 
P j
c X I
c X I
j ij k j
m ij k j
m
( )
exp( )
exp( )
/
/
=
+
+∑
ρ
ρ
      (4) 
The model can be estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function is as stated in 
equation (5), where y is an indicator variable which takes a value of one when person i 
chooses option k (and thus, by implication, option j). 
∑∑=
i k
jPjkPikyL )]()|(log[log                          (5) 
Like the CLM, the NLM only uses information on the first best option identified in 
each choice set. 
Data is analysed in the first instance using the CLM as well using a NLM where 
appropriate. Models are estimated using STATA 11 software.  
All variables used within the econometric analysis are listed in Table 2. Attributes 
closure and payment entered the models as continuous variables. A large dichotomy 
was seen in preferences for small meshing between fishers so ‘Size of permitted net 
meshing’ (Table 1) was entered as two dummy variables (Table 2): ‘Netsmall’ where 
minimum legal meshing was 1” and as ‘Netlarge’ where minimum legal meshing was 
6”. These dummies were contrasted to the baseline of 3” mesh size as this is the current 
legal status quo.  
A modelling constant, i.e. an alternative specific constant (ASC) for choosing the status 
quo alternative, was included in the models (Table 2). The role of the ASC is to account 
for any unobserved variation in choices that cannot be explained by either the 
attributes or socioeconomic determinants. 
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Table 2. Variable list and descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variables Definition Mean 
 
SD min max 
Closure Continuous variable for % marine area 
designated no-take zone and closed to 
fishers relative to current fishing grounds: 
0; 10; 25 & 50% closure. 
13.5 17.9 0.0 50.0 
Netsmall 
Dummy for net with 1” mesh size 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Netbase 
Dummy for net with 3” mesh size, current 
Tanzanian legal mesh size  
0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Netlarge 
Dummy for net with 6” mesh size 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Payment US Weekly payment offered as compensation 
for implementation of new management 
scenario. Payment transformed into US $: -
0.690; 3.448; 6.897; 13.793.   
3.7 5.1 -0.7 13.8 
ASC Dummy for Alternative Specific Constant/ 
choosing of status quo 
0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Demographics      
Age Age of respondent (years) 35.0 12.7 16.0 82.0 
Edu Count variable for respondent’s level of 
education: 2= attended secondary or above; 
1= attended primary; 0 = no education 
0.7 0.5 0.0 2.0 
Inc Continuous variable for respondent’s 
annual income from fishing (US $) 
862.7 1,215.4 0.0 10,925.0 
      
inpark Dummy for location: village found inside 
park borders =1; village located outside =0 
0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
illegal Dummy for those fishing having used 
illegal fishing methods: 1=fish illegally; 
0=fish legally 
0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
land Continuous variable for area of land owned 
in ha; used as proxy for reliance on fishing 
whereby those with larger holding are 
assumed to have lower reliance of fishing  
2.1 5.7 0.0 60.0 
 
5. Results 
5.1  Descriptive results 
After exclusion of incomplete questionnaires and initial pilots, the sample size was 317 
fishers.  
Table 3 displays the key demographics for the final sample as broken down for villages 
and overall. Average fisher age was 35 years and household size was 4.9. Education 
levels were low across all villages; in all villages, fishers whom had attended secondary 
school was lower than 7% of the final sample. Table 4 indicates the mean fishing 
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characteristics of sample respondents by village, as well as grouped for in and outside 
of the park. Villages appear to have apparent disparities between fishing and non-
fishing income activities across villages. For example, average fishing income was as 
high as US$ 4.81 a day in Pemba but as low as US$ 1.31 in Mngoji. Furthermore, the 
number of fishers with other income sources also varied across villages, Mkubiru 
indicated 71% of fishers claimed non-fishing income revenues; in Pemba village this 
figure was only 26%. These results could highlight different levels of dependence on 
fishing as a livelihood. 
 
Table 3. Mean demographic characteristics of sample respondents 
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
          
No.  75 39 62 33 58 50 317 176 141 
Age 35.5 37.3 32.9 43.0 33.6 33.5 35.3 35.0 35.7 
HH_size 4.6 5.4 4.3 5.5 5.5 4.4 4.9 4.7 5.1 
Education  
(% sample) 
         
None 25.3 18.0 38.7 36.4 27.6 24.0 28.4 28.4 28.4 
Primary 69.3 79.5 58.1 63.6 65.5 74.0 67.8 67.6 68.1 
Secondary or 
above 
5.3 2.6 3.2 0.0 6.9 2.0 3.8 4.0 3.5 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, Mngi=Mngoji, 
Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mean fishing and alternative occupation characteristics of sample respondents 
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
          
Fishing income 
as daily wage:  
2.4 1.6 1.3 2.6 1.9 4.8 2.4 1.9 3.1 
Weekly fishing 
income 
17.1 11.0 9.2 18.6 13.4 33.8 17.1 13.1 21.8 
% with non-
fishing income 
source 
0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 
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Average area of 
cultivated land 
2.0 3.3 2.8 2.6 1.2 0.9 2.1 2.6 1.4 
% currently 
employing illegal 
gears 
0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
% who in past 
employed illegal 
gears 
0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, Mngi=Mngoji, 
Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba. 
 
5.2 Econometric results 
As noted, 317 fishers completed the choice task and accompanying survey. Of these, 
221 respondents (70.0%) made at least one choice which was a deviation from the 
status quo (i.e. alternative A or B in the choice set). 96 fishers chose the status quo in all 
six choices. Of these 96, 68 respondents perceived the status quo to be their preferred 
option, the main reasoning being a dislike of any form of marine closure. The 
remaining 28 respondents (8.8% of the final sample) were considered to be protests and 
dropped from the final analysis. Protest votes arise when respondents do not state 
their true preferences which can lead to bias in the final utility estimates. Protests were 
considered those respondents who selected the status quo in all choice sets, made at 
least one irrational choice and provided no follow up explanation for choices made.  
5.2.1 The base model 
The main estimation strategy relies on the NLM. While the conditional logit assumes 
uncorrelated errors, the nested logit specifies the error structure more flexibly and 
allows some correlation within parent-levels. A log likelihood test indicated the IIA 
hypothesis could be rejected (p-value 0.088); as such the NLM is favoured over the 
simpler CLM model. Analysis revealed broadly consistent results across both models, 
with slight adjustments in attribute coefficients.  
The base model results (i.e. model containing attributes only) are reported in column 1 
of Table 5. Column 2 reports the results of the CLM for comparison. 
Table 5. Model estimates for base specification  
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
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Closure -0.010 *** 0.003  -0.013 *** 0.003 
Net_small 0.075  0.109  0.112  0.127 
Net_large -0.573 *** 0.126  -0.700 *** 0.119 
Payment_US 0.061 *** 0.009  0.072 *** 0.007 
ASC 0.780 *** 0.144  0.957 *** 0.107 
        
Log-L -1623.7652  -1625.2184 
Adj-Pseudo R2   0.1308 
Waldchi  62.05  250.69 
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 5106  5106 
N(cases) 1702   
LR test for IIA P>chi2 0.088   
Robust standard errors have been used. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level and 
(***) at the 1% level.  
 
The results reveal that the varying attribute levels influenced willingness to adopt PES 
schemes. Size of marine closure and having 6” net meshing were negatively associated 
with willingness to enrol in marine PES (-0.013, p<0.01 and -0.700, p<0,01 respectively). 
The magnitude of payment offered by the scheme was also a significant determinant 
and, as expected, showed a positive relationship with willingness to enrol (0.072, 
p<0.01). The possibility of a PES management scheme which allowed the use of 
extremely small mesh sizes did not appear to significantly influence fisher’s choice. 
The results indicate fishers show a preference for PES schemes which have smaller no-
take areas and that allow the medium mesh size (3”). However, increasing payment 
associated with PES scheme will enable greater restrictions to be placed upon the 
conservation area, such as larger no-take zones and mesh sizings. The trade-offs 
between these attributes are discussed later in the paper.  
The ASC was also seen to enter positively and significantly, that is after controlling for 
all attributes respondents were still more likely to pick the status quo. This indicates a 
general preference overall for the status quo, and an overall reluctance to engage with 
management changes.  
5.2.2 Implicit prices 
Inclusion of the payment term within the model enables estimation of the marginal 
rate of substitution (MRS) between attributes and compensation levels, and indicates 
the monetary utility loss associated with each management restriction.  
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Implicit prices are expressed in Table 6. As the NLM assumes a linear utility function, 
implicit prices (IP) are expressed as the ratio of the attribute of interest’s coefficient and 
that of monetary value (Bennett & Blamey 2001). 
      (7) 
Table 6. Implicit prices: WTA 
 Base model: nested Base model: conditional 
Closure (US$/10% additional closure) 1.583 1.808 
Net_small (3” decrease to 1”net)9  
(US$/1” reduction in length of mesh) 
-1.222 
-0.611 
-1.543 
0.772 
Net_large (3” increase to 6” net)  
(US$/1” additional length of mesh)  
9.351                           
3.117 
9.674                             
3.225 
ASC 12.721 13.239 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, when all other variables were held constant, closure of an 
additional 10% of seascape would require an additional US $1.60 a week in 
compensation. Interestingly, additional net mesh restrictions appear to represent a 
higher utility cost in comparison. In order to gain acceptance of increased mesh 
restrictions of 3” to 6” minimum size, weekly compensation of almost US$ 10 per fisher 
is required; and a 1” increase requires US$ 3.20. 
Deviation away from the status quo indicated the highest loss to fishers and indicated 
an implicit price of US$ 12.7210.  
5.2.3 Economic surplus 
The economic surplus associated with the implementation of each new alternative 
management option in contrast to the current status quo can be calculated using 
equation (8) below (Bennett & Blamey 2001)11. 
                                                     
9 Deviation to small meshing is also displayed although it should be noted that within 
the base model this variable was seen to be a non-significant determinant. 
10 Calculated from equation (6) where ASC=0.7797918/0.0612984 = 12.72 
11 The ASC parameter is often ignored in CE welfare measures however conceptually the ASC effect is a 
component of the indirect utility function and should be included. The ASC can account for unobserved 
attributes which are known to the individual but not the researcher as well as a ‘pure’ preference for the 
current situation (Boxall et al. 2009; Bennett & Blamey 2001).  
 22 
    (8) 
When: 
 
 
Table 7 displays the economic surplus of all possible combinations of management 
strategies associated with the various PES management scenarios.  
Table 7. Economic surplus under differing management options: US$ -/week 
Mesh size 
 (“) 
Size of closure 
(% closure current fishing grounds) 
 0 10 25 50 
1 -11.499 -13.082 -15.457 -19.414 
3 - -14.304 -16.678 -20.635 
6 -22.072 -23.655 -26.029 -29.987 
 
As expected the greatest utility loss is associated with those management options with 
the greatest restrictions. Only one management strategy indicated a lower loss, this 
was via the introduction of smaller meshing and with no closure; however again it 
should be noted that a deviation from the current 3” meshing to 1” was not a 
significant determinant. Interestingly, fishers perceived restricting net meshing to 6” 
would lower their utility slightly more so than a closure as large as half their current 
fishing grounds, although overall the two were broadly equal in utility loss (a utility 
loss of 22.1 vs. 20.6).  
 
5.2.4 Trade-offs between restriction types 
In order to understand any trade-offs being made between the two restriction types, a 
further analysis was conducted. Trade-offs are calculated using a similar deviation as 
for implicit pricing whereby the willingness to trade-off between any pairs of attributes 
is the ratio of these attributes as shown below. 
  (9) 
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Results are presented in Table 8. From the data, it appears that fishers approximately 
equate a twenty percent closure as similar in utility loss to that of a 1” increase in 
allowable mesh size from the current 3” net.  
 
 
Table 8. Trade-offs analysis 
 Base model: nested 
Closure/Net_large:  
(10% additional closure)/ 1” additional length of mesh) 
0.508 
Net_large/Closure:  
(1” additional length of mesh)/ (10% additional closure) 
1.969 
 
5.2.5 Predicted probabilities: accepting PES design 
Predicted rates of adoption are estimated for a number of various PES management 
scenarios from the base model and displayed in the following tables12. Tables 9a-c 
indicate the predicted probabilities of various PES management designs. Table 9a and 
9b display those management designs with only one restriction from the current status 
quo under the minimum and maximum payment option. Table 9c shows the predicted 
probabilities associated with mixed restrictions under the highest payment.  
As can be seen in Tables 9a-c uptake of schemes shows high variability dependent 
upon attribute levels and payments offered. Offering weekly compensation values of 
5,000 TSh (US$ 3.5) (Table 9a) appeared too low to promote reasonable adoption of the 
PES schemes investigated; only approximately half of the population would be willing 
to sign on for the PES design with the lowest restriction of a 10% closure. Raising the 
weekly compensation payment from US$ 3.5 to US$ 13.8 increased predicted adoption 
to 70% (Table 9b) under this least restrictive scenario.  
                                                     
12 Predicted probabilities are produced using the CLM due to its relative ease of calculation and because 
results are consistent across both CLM and NLM.  
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However, even with such a minimal restriction, 30% of the sample respondents were 
unwilling to participate. This value rises to approximately 55% for the two harsher 
restrictions of a 50% closure or a restriction on net mesh size of  <6” independently, 
even when the highest compensation value was offered (Table 9b). One might expect 
that these relatively low predicted probabilities are due to a high utility cost associated 
with any move away from the status quo (ASC).  
Again, the predicted probabilities associated with those PES schemes utilising a 
mixture of restrictions are also low, despite the higher compensation offered (Table 9c). 
Unfortunately the high utility associated with an increase to 6” in net mesh size may 
override any major trade-off benefits being seen. For example, implementing a 10% 
closure alongside the 6” mesh restriction reduces the adoption rate by only 2.2%. While 
this is a good outcome for the implementation of a mixed PES scheme, adoption rate is 
still very low due to the resistance against increased net restrictions and again the 
initial move away from the status quo.  
 
5.2.6 Robustness check 
A selection of socio-demographics variables as described in Table 4 were added in an 
extension to the original model in order to test the robustness of the model findings. 
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Results are shown in Table 10. With inclusion of socio-demographic variables, results 
remain broadly consistent; all significant attributes retain significance albeit to a lesser 
extent.  
Small mesh size 1” (Netsmall) enters the model as positive and significant at the 10% 
level, indicating a preference for smaller nets within management scenarios by some 
fishers. An interaction term between age and Netsmall (age_netsm) further suggests that 
younger men prefer this option. Income interacted with a dummy for the larger 6” nets 
(inc_netlg) indicates that higher earners are more likely to prefer PES management 
scenarios which increase mesh net restrictions to 6”.  
The ASC drops out as significant once socio-demographics are entered. Income enters 
as a significant positive determinant of a preference for the status quo and 
management options which include a movement to larger net meshing.  
 
 
 
Table 10. Robustness check: model extension with socio-demographic controls  
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
Closure -0.018 ** 0.008  -0.024 ** 0.009 
Netsmall 0.611 * 0.359  0.792 * 0.456 
Netlarge -0.626 * 0.323  -0.774 * 0.406 
Payment_US 0.066 *** 0.022  0.083 *** 0.026 
ASC 0.304  0.354  0.563  0.369 
        
Age_close 2.5e-04  1.5e-04  2.7e-04  2.0e-04 
Age_netsm -0.017 ** 0.008  -0.022 ** 0.010 
Age_netlg 0.003  0.007  0.002  0.009 
Age_pay -1.7e-04  4.6e-04  -1.4e-04  5.7e-04 
Age_ASC 0.007  0.008  0.005  0.008 
        
Edu_close -8.6e-04  0.004  3.4e-04  0.005 
Edu_netsm -0.091  0.186  -0.094  0.238 
Edu_netlg -0.271  0.178  -0.317  0.225 
Edu_pay 0.005  0.012  0.007  0.014 
Edu_ASC -0.025  0.189  -0.006  0.202 
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Inc_close 1.5e-06  2.2e-06  9.8e-07  2.6e-06 
Inc_netsm 1.2e-04  1.0e-04  1.7e-04  1.3e-04 
Inc_netlg 2.3e-04 *** 8.6e-05  2.9e-04 *** 1.0e-04 
Inc_pay -9.3e-06  7.4e-06  -1.3e-05  8.3e-06 
Inc_ASC 2.8e-04 *** 8.0e-05  3.0e-04 *** 9.0e-05 
    
Log-L -1531.6516  -1543.9215 
Adj-Pseudo R2   0.1458 
Waldchi  78.89  305.27 
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 4803  4803 
N (cases) 1637   
    
LR test for IIA P>chi2 0.0203   
Robust standard errors have been used. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at 
the 5% level and (***) at the 1% level. 
 
5.2.7 ASC model 
Excluding those responses considered protests, the status quo was seen to be the 
preferred choice in just over half of the choice sets (55.1%). However, 221 respondents 
deviated away from the status quo (the ASC) in at least one choice set within the CE. 
This suggests that the status quo was the dominant choice in a number of the sets 
presented. This is expected as the sets were randomly chosen each time and great 
variation within fisher’s preferences led to few other cards being predominantly 
chosen.  
Table 11. ASC model specification  
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
Closure -0.015 *** 0.005         -0.016 *** 0.003 
Net_small 0.084  0.140  0.093  0.137 
Net_large -0.759 *** 0.147  -0.788 *** 0.133 
Payment_US 0.074 *** 0.104  0.077 *** 0.008 
ASC 0.907 ** 0.407  0.946 ** 0.389 
ASC_inpark -1.529 *** 0.199  -1.535 *** 0.198 
ASC_illegal 0.489 ** 0.198  0.491 ** 0.198 
ASC_earnings 0.228 * 0.117  0.228 * 0.117 
ASC_land -0.014  0.024  -0.014  0.024 
        
Log-L -1403.9111  -1403.976 
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Adj-Pseudo R2   0.2018 
Waldchi  230.73  258.10 
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 4803  4803 
N(cases) 1601   
LR test for IIA P>chi2 0.7186   
Robust standard errors have been used. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level and 
(***) at the 1% level. 
 
Sixty-eight respondents picked the status quo in all 6 choice sets, 21.5% of the final 
sample. Given this fairly large selection of the status quo, a further model was run to 
determine those characteristics most likely to influence this choice. The ASC model is 
displayed in Table 11. All attributes retain significance within this final model. 
Coefficients remain fairly consistent in both magnitude and direction. When interacted 
with the ASC dummy, those who used illegal gear (illegal) and fishing earnings 
(earnings) entered the model positively and significantly. Land owned (land), taken as 
a proxy for dependence upon fishing whereby larger land holdings allowed further 
diversification, showed no significant influence on choice of status quo. Location, i.e. 
those living within the park, (inpark) was seen as a negative determinant in ASC 
choice, e.g. those living outside of the park showed a higher reluctance to move away 
from the status quo.  
6. Discussion 
Design of PES restriction options was seen to influence scheme adoption rates by local 
fishers. Similar results have been shown in studies in terrestrial PES-like AES 
(Espinosa‐Goded et al. 2010; Ruto & Garrod 2009). Fishers indicated heterogeneous 
preferences for various marine PES restrictions, indicated by the different utilities 
associated with the two attributes investigated. Results were comparable across both 
the NLM and simpler CLM for all regressions.  
6.1 Trade-offs and participation 
As expected, increasing restrictions negatively influenced adoption of PES schemes, 
and higher compensation payments increased adoption. PES programs were associated 
with a high utility loss by fishers; the PES management scenario with the lowest 
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restriction (a closure of 10%) reduced fisher utility by US$ 14.3 per week (Table 7): 
83.6% of mean weekly earnings. A closure of 25% to current fishing grounds was 
associated with a slightly higher utility loss of US$ 16.7 a week, almost the average 
weekly earnings of fishers in the area (US$ 17.1). Furthermore, restricting legal net 
meshing to a minimum of 6” from 3” had an associated weekly utility loss of US$ 30.0, 
nearly twice the mean fisher weekly earnings.   
Perhaps more interesting than these absolute values are the trade-offs and respective 
utilities associated with the management restrictions in question. Often marine 
closures are met with local resistance and gear restrictions can be more readily 
acceptable (Cinner et al. 2009a; Christie 2004; McClanahan & Mangi 2004). However 
within the communities surveyed here, it appears that gear restrictions, more 
specifically the utility loss associated with net restrictions may be met with greater 
opposition. Fishers equated a restriction of an additional inch on mesh size as 
approximately similar to a closure of 20%. Accounting for the ASC value, the loss 
associated with the prohibition of fishing with meshing less than 6” (weekly 
compensation of US$ 22.1) was broadly consistent with, if only a little larger, than the 
compensation associated with a 50% closure (US$ 20.6). However, a 50% closure might 
appear as a much more extreme intervention from a management perspective.  
It should be noted that the net restriction presented herein is a very specific gear 
restriction, and may have met with such resistance due to local circumstances. Within 
the Mtwara area, seizure of inappropriate gear is commonplace and carries with it the 
confiscation of accompanying catch and boat. In recent years, Tanzania implemented a 
law which outlawed the use of any nets with mesh sizes smaller than the 3” used as a 
baseline within this study (Dadi 2010). From local focus groups and follow up survey 
questions, many local fishers felt that even the use of these baseline nets were 
ineffective at catching adequate fish as overall fish sizes within the coastal areas are 
small. In addition the most commonly used boat, a non-motorised canoe, did not 
enable access to the more productive and deeper water areas where fish are larger and 
more abundant. Indeed, as seen in Table 10 higher earners were more likely to prefer 
those PES interventions which restricted net meshing to 6”, perhaps due to the 
improved ability of larger boats to access deeper waters where larger fish can be 
caught.  
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In addition, the lower unit utility losses relating to marine closures could be explained 
due to a perception that these closures are harder to enforce, hence easier to ignore. 
Within the area, marine park officials have attempted to monitor possible closed areas 
with little effect. Moreover, fishers may, quite rightly, believe that their activities can be 
displaced to new fishing areas outside of the restricted zones, hence decreasing the 
utility loss associated with this management restriction.  
6.2 Resistance to change 
Another interesting, although perhaps not unexpected, finding was the high utility loss 
associated with any deviation away from the status quo. When calculating the 
predicted rates of adoption, increasing the level of attribute restrictions resulted in only 
a mild decrease in adoption rates compared to the initial PES implementation in the 
first place. For example, increasing the closure restriction from 10% to 25% was 
associated with a drop in adoption of only 4.9% when offered 5,000 TSh per week (US$ 
3.5) and 4.2% under a weekly compensation package of 20,000 TSh (US$ 13.8). Yet, 
approximately one third and one half respectively were unlikely to adopt a PES with 
minimum restrictions in the first instance under the same payment schemes (70.4, 
Table 9b; 53.0, Table 9a). Moreover, results indicated that fishers would be willing to 
pay as much as US$ 12.7 (74% of fishers’ weekly income) to retain the current 
management practices, once all attributes had been controlled for.  
As many as 21.4% of the final sample chose the status quo in all choice sets. Status quo 
bias is well documented within the CE decision making literature (Boxall et al., 2009; 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). When faced with choices between new alternatives 
and the status quo, individuals unduly choose the current situation. This decision to 
remain with the status quo can be motivated by protest beliefs, an inaction to choose, 
an inability to engage with the more complex experimental design of CE or a genuine 
preference for the current situation (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2009). An attempt to limit 
the incidence of these former three groups was made through the use of a simple and 
relevant attribute design within the CE. In addition, those respondents who picked the 
status quo in all six choice sets and did not provide appropriate follow up reasoning 
were omitted from the final analysis. However, a status quo bias was still noted within 
the data. Unlike much of the proceeding work in CE and environmental goods, the 
research herein relates to an initial loss by fishers and not an obvious utility 
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improvement (e.g. loss of fishing grounds and a reduced ability to catch fish), although 
hopefully with some environmental improvement in the not so distant future. The 
literature indicates that changes which are considered detrimental (e.g. losses) loom 
larger on a respondent’s mind than any improvements or gains (Kahneman et al., 
1991). For this reason, fishers may have shown greater hesitation to participate.  
On further analysis it was seen that certain groups were more likely to choose the 
status quo. Those individuals living outside of the marine park, where current 
enforcement is weaker and communities have less experience with enforcement 
bodies, were less likely to choose adoption of an alternative management scenario. In 
addition, those fishers who had illegal gear  (e.g. nets with mesh <3”) were more likely 
to stick with the status quo, even once net attributes had been controlled for. Again, 
within this sub population, it seems reasonable to expect resistance to change. Illegal 
fishers are likely to be more dubious of local authorities and the increased restrictions, 
having had more negative interactions with relevant authorities and perhaps viewing 
them as less legitimate (Crawford et al. 2004). Fisher perceptions of legitimacy have 
been shown to be important determinants in compliance behaviour (Hønneland, 2000). 
Moreover, illegal fishers already function under the base requirements perhaps making 
adoption of required gear more difficult and costly.  
It was also noted that fishing income was a positive determinant for selection of the 
status quo. This is an interesting finding. Indeed in many WTP studies, income 
signifies a budget constraint and is used as a validity test within case studies (Schläpfer 
2006; Mitchell & Carson 1993). However, in this circumstance it is a compensation 
value (a WTA) which is being analysed and income is not a constraint. Indeed, one 
might expect that those fishers who earn less would be willing to accept less as 
compensation. Here the selection to remain with the status quo by those who earn 
more is interesting if perhaps not totally unexpected. Bigger earners, more likely boat 
owners with high investment into the sector, are likely to be fairly happy with the 
current perceived situation and reluctant to induce any changes or impose new risks 
which may impact upon this. Similar findings have been seen with respect to fisher 
resistance to change practices (e.g. exit a fishery). Pradhan and Leung (2004) found that 
potential annual fishery earnings was a significant positive determinant in fisher’s 
reluctance to exit fisheries. The same study also indicated those vessel owners who 
fished using their own boats (e.g. not absentee owners) were more likely to remain. 
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Similar results relating to ownership were seen by Ikiara and Odink (2000). 
Furthermore, it could simply be a case that the weekly compensation rates offered 
within the CE were simply too low for higher earner to make adoption worthwhile. 
Furthermore, when socio-demographic variables were entered into the model the 
dummy for retention of the status quo was no longer seen to be significant. An 
interaction term between fishing income and the ASC was seen to be a strong 
significant positive determinant of status quo choice. This provides further support 
that those higher earners were more likely to stick with the status quo.  
6.3 Implications for marine PES 
Perhaps two of the more interesting findings are as follows. Firstly, although various 
attribute levels influence management adoption, hence acceptance, it is possible that 
within those coastal areas creating an environment whereby change is not met with 
apprehension and hostility could be equally as important, if not more so. Deviation 
away from the status quo carried with it a high initial utility cost, comparable and 
greater than those associated with the restrictions themselves. In such cases, efforts to 
support local communities, build trust and ease transition to new management 
practices may be more fruitful and cost-effective, if albeit a little more time consuming 
at the on-set.  
Secondly, overall the cost of a PES scheme may be too high. The hypothetical PES 
scheme which offered the lowest compensation of US$ 3.5 per week to fishers for a 
restriction of 10% closure is estimated to be adopted by only 50% of the target 
population. Moreover, a PES offering a much higher weekly compensation of US$ 13.8 
for the same minimal restriction failed to entice as much as a third of the population. 
While this may not seem like much, it must be noted that compensation is based on a 
weekly payment and must be aggregated for an entire fishing community.  
Furthermore, results indicated that income is a positive determinant for opting out of 
PES management change. If weekly compensation rates cannot entice higher earners, 
who undoubtedly are often the highest extractors of the resource, PES schemes are 
unlikely to accomplish conservation goals (Engel et al. 2008; Wunder 2007). Indeed, 
within coastal communities fishing incomes can vary widely with some fishers barely 
catching enough for subsistence, let alone commercial activities, while other can be 
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considered well off by local standards. Payments may be required to reflect all of these 
population groups, perhaps via differentiated payments. However, differentiated 
payments bring with them increased opportunity costs and can induce conflict 
between parties (Jack et al., 2008). Alternatively non-cash incentive structure could be 
structured and introduced to induce participation. For example, access to storage 
facilities may enable fishers to better negotiate prices and would increase profits 
relatively for all fishers involved, so long as access is not monopolised.  
6.4 Limitations and future research 
In order to reduce the cognitive burden associated with CE, design was limited to two 
attributes, closure and allowable mesh size, with four and three levels respectively. 
However, this design limited the ability to report on trade-offs and design of 
appropriate restriction levels. For example, the restriction on small meshing was seen 
as insignificant. Therefore for gear management restriction was limited to only current 
and large meshing and limited the management scenarios available.  
In addition, that utility loss from a 50% closure of current fishing areas equated to that 
of an 3” increase in mesh size may generate concern that respondents were unaware of 
what they were being asked. However, as previously mentioned, it is not unreasonable 
that fishers might value these smaller meshed nets so highly given local circumstances.  
Despite these limitations, the findings herein could be the valuable subject of on-going 
investigation. Future studies may aim to move beyond this case study and replicate 
research. In addition, there is scope for more detailed work on those further attributes 
fishers may respond to, in terms of both restrictive strategies as well as what non-
monetary incentives that may induce participation e.g. access to improved markets and 
storage facilities to name a few. 
It will also be useful to identify if those attributes identified herein, as well as 
additional attributes so far not addressed, continue to be significant determinants over 
a wider sample of artisanal fisher communities. What similarities lie within case 
studies as well as those site-specific qualities?  
Given the large utility loss associated with a movement away from the status quo, it 
would also be informative to identify whether this is a common feature within fishing 
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communities. Indeed, as previously noted, reluctance to exit fisheries by fishers has 
been identified within recent studies (Cinner et al. 2009b; Teh et al. 2008; Pradhan & 
Leung 2004; Ikiara & Odink 2000). This inertia to change may also transcend into less 
extreme novel management strategies. On the other hand, the relatively large utility 
loss recorded herein could relate to site conditions; at least in part, local conditions are 
anticipated to have played some role in the magnitude of this perceived loss. For 
example, those communities located outside of the marine park were more likely to 
stick with the status quo, perhaps due to a greater mistrust of or a reluctance to engage 
with new and less known regulating bodies. Further studies should identify those 
circumstances which have culminated to produce this effect as well as those fishers 
more likely to perceive a loss, as well as those PES interventions which will mitigate 
this loss.  
7. Conclusions 
Overall the study finds CE to be a useful policy tool in identifying fishers’ preferences 
for various management options. CE enables explicit analysis of trade-offs, as well as 
and their appropriate levels. CE can assist in evaluating which management 
alternatives may be of least-cost as well as locally accepted and effective in their 
conservation goal. This will be key in the concurrent design of appropriate 
conservation and development tools and in particular cost-effective PES. The CE 
methodology can also identify those groups less willing to engage in such novel 
schemes, as well as identifying those aspects of instrument design which may 
disincentivise participation; in doing so CE can help recognise whether the restrictions 
are inappropriate if there is a reluctance for change overall.  
The research shows that fishers are currently reluctant to move away from the status 
quo, and that associated costs in promoting this transition will be high. Mechanisms 
which reduce this initial transition cost are called for, as are conditional non-monetary 
incentives which can allow fishers to sustain their welfare at a lower cost.  
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